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1 Introduction
Many papers on cardinal Social Choice Theory begin with the assumption that
individual utilities have been measured by some means, and that we want to
aggregate them into a collective preference represented by a Social Welfare
Functional W . Some axioms like neutrality, anonymity and Pareto are then
imposed. These are usually easy to interpret. But in order to arrive at a char-
acterization, more conditions are needed. That is why, in many papers, some
invariance conditions are used [e.g. Sen, 1970, d’Aspremont and Gevers, 1977,
Roberts, 1980, Bossert, 1991]. These conditions are supposed to represent the
informational basis of the social preferences. Contrary to the other conditions,
the invariance conditions are not easily interpretable and, often, misunder-
stood. The reason is that they fail to distinguish between a transformation of
the well-being and a transformation of the numerical representation thereof.
This problem has been discussed at length in Morreau and Weymark [2016].
Similar discussions, in different contexts, can be found in [Roemer, 1996, Sec.
2.5] and [Marchant, 2008].
To avoid the above-mentioned ambiguity, Morreau and Weymark [2016]
introduce a new formalism making explicit reference to the measurement scale
being used. This way, they can make a distinction between two kind of in-
variance conditions: those corresponding to a transformation of the well-being
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(without any change of the measurement scale) and those corresponding to
a change of the measurement scale (without any change of the well-being).
Although this formalism is definitely precise and unambiguous, we think an-
other approach can be enlightening. Instead of supposing that individual util-
ities have been measured before we consider their aggregation, we suggest to
characterize the whole process of measuring individual utilities (by observing
individual preferences) and aggregating them. The advantage of this approach
is that the statements of characterization theorems are then exempt of any
reference to individual utilities. Since individual utilities are not empirically
observable, we deem it preferable to avoid using them as primitives of our the-
ories, so as to obtain theorems that are easier to interpret. In doing this, we
follow a long tradition: for instance [Arrow, 1963, p.109, bottom] and [Dhillon
and Mertens, 1999, p.473, top].
Characterizations of cardinal aggregation procedures without reference to
individual utilities can be found in the literature. For instance, Harsanyi’s
Theorem [Harsanyi, 1955]. This single-profile result has often been criticized
for not answering the question it aims to answer [e.g. Weymark, 1991].
More recently, there have been a couple of papers about relative utilitar-
ianism in a purely ordinal setting. Relative utilitarianism is a particular case
of utilitarianism in which individual utilities are normalized between 0 and 1.
Dhillon [1998]1 characterizes relative utilitarianism using inter alia a strong
Pareto condition. The latter is very unusual in the sense that, for each biparti-
tion of the set of voters, it assumes the existence of two social welfare functions
satisfying some kind of Pareto condition. A remarkable paper by Dhillon and
Mertens [1999] also characterizes relative utilitarianism.
Another paper about relative utilitarianism in a purely ordinal setting is
Börgers and Choo [2017b]. Their goal is to represent existing preferences of the
individuals and of the social planner. They assume they can observe sufficiently
many choices of a social planner to infer his/her preferences.
Let us also mention a paper by Sprumont [2013] about cardinal social choice
theory in a purely ordinal framework. He characterizes relative egalitarianism,
i.e. an aggregation procedure that ranks alternatives by applying the leximin
ordering to the profile of 0-1 normalized utilities corresponding to the profile
of preferences.
In summary, there are few results in the axiomatic literature about car-
dinal aggregation procedures in a purely ordinal and multi-profile setting:
Dhillon [1998], Dhillon and Mertens [1999], Börgers and Choo [2017b], Spru-
mont [2013]. None of them characterizes the general form of utilitarianism
(they focus on relative utilitarianism). The aim of this paper is precisely to
present such a result.
To some extent, Smith’s characterization of scoring rules [Smith, 1973]
could be considered as a characterization of utilitarianism, where scores play
the role of individual utilities. The problem with this interpretation of Smith’s
1 Börgers and Choo [2017a] have shown that the proof of the main result in Dhillon [1998]
is incorrect. Yet, the main result might be correct.
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result is that the choice of a particular score vector is completely arbitrary
and not justified by any theory. Our approach is related to Smith’s or, more
precisely to Young’s characterization of scoring rules [Young, 1975] because
we consider social choice correspondences and not social welfare functions.
Besides, we use a slightly different framework and add some conditions to his
so that the use of VNM utilities is completely justified. The reason why we
consider social choice correspondences and not social welfare functions is that
we use a result by Pivato [2014] which is stated in terms of a social choice
correspondence. We are not aware of an equivalent result for social welfare
functions.
In the sequel, we consider the following problem. A social planner wants
to choose a subset of alternatives from some finite set X, taking preferences
of voters into account. The social planner wants the choice to possibly depend
on individual strengths of preferences or some kind of cardinal information.
The voters therefore express their preferences by means of Von Neumann-
Morgenstern preference relations defined on the set of all lotteries with prizes
in X. The social planner then uses a social choice correspondence associating
a subset of X to each profile of VNM preference relations over lotteries. In
Section 2, we characterize the family of all anonymous utilitarian social choice
correspondences, i.e. choice sets containing all alternatives for which the (un-
weighted) sum of individual VNM utilities is maximal. In section 3, we consider
a special member of this family: relative utilitarianism. The fourth section is
devoted to the logical independence of our axioms and the last section to some
open problems or directions for future research.
2 Characterization of anonymous utilitarianism
2.1 Notation and definitions
Let X be the finite set of alternatives (with #X ≥ 3 and typical elements
x, y, z) and Π = {p, q, r, . . .} be the set of all probability distributions on X.
Each such probability distribution is called a lottery. Given the lottery p in
Π, the probability that x obtains is denoted by px.
2 The lottery such that x
obtains with certainty is denoted by x. It is called a safe lottery. The set of
all binary relations on Π is R = 2Π×Π . If R ∈ R, then P and I respectively
denote the asymmetric and the symmetric part thereof. A binary relation R on
Π is a von Neumann-Morgenstern (VNM) relation [Jensen, 1967] if it satisfies
– weak order: it is transitive, reflexive and complete;
– independence: if p P q, then λp+ (1−λ)r P λq+ (1−λ)r for all λ ∈ ]0, 1[;
– continuity: if p P q and q P r, then there are λ, λ′ ∈ ]0, 1[ such that
λp+ (1− λ)r P q and q P λ′p+ (1− λ′)r.
2 An anonymous reviewer suggested an alternative interpretation for the lottery p: given a
finite time horizon, px is the proportion of time spent in state x or proportion of time spent
consuming good x, or . . . All models and axioms presented in the sequel can be interpreted
with risk or time in mind.
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Most other definitions of VNM relations would work equally well. Let V ⊂ R
be the set of all VNM relations on Π. We say a binary relation R has an
expected utility representation if there exists a mapping u : X → R such that






qxu(x), for all p, q ∈ Π. (1)
A binary relation has an expected utility representation as in (1) if and only
if it is a VNM relation [Jensen, 1967]. The utility function u in (1) is a VNM
utility function; it is unique up to a positive affine transformation.
Given a finite set of agents N ⊂ N, a profile % = (%i)i∈N is an element
of V N indexed by the elements of N , where %i is the preference relation of






We define a VNM Social Choice Correspondence (SCC) as a mapping f : P →
2X \ ∅, that is, a mapping from the set of all possible profiles to the set of all
non-empty subsets of X. Notice that the choice set is a subset of X and not
of Π. We want to choose alternatives, i.e. elements of X, even though the
preferential information we use is defined on the richer set Π.
Let σX be a permutation on X and Σ the set of all such permutations.
Then σΠ is a permutation on Π defined by (σΠ(p))x = pσ(x) for all x ∈ X and
p ∈ Π. Similarly, σR is a permutation on R defined by σΠ(p) σR(R) σΠ(q) iff
p R q for all p, q ∈ Π and all R ∈ R. And σP is a permutation on P defined
by σP((%i)i∈N ) = (σR(%i))i∈N for all (%i)i∈N ∈ P. We henceforth abuse
notation and write σ without subscript for all these permutations.
A VNM Social Choice Correspondence is anonymous and utilitarian iff it
is defined by





where u : V ×X → R is such that
(i) u(R, ·) is a VNM utility function, for any R ∈ V ,
(ii) u is neutral, i.e., u(σ(R), x) = u(R, σ(x)), for any R ∈ V and x ∈ X.
The aim of this section is to characterize the family of all anonymous utilitarian
VNM Social Choice Correspondences.
To help the reader understand the concept of a neutral VNM utility func-
tion, we provide an example of a VNM utility function that violates neutrality.
Suppose X = {x, y, z}. Let R and R′ be VNM preference relations such that
y I 0.4x + 0.6z and x I ′ 0.4y + 0.6z. Notice that R′ is obtained from R by
permuting x and y. So, R′ = σ(R) with σ defined by σ(x) = y, σ(y) = x
and σ(z) = z. Consider a VNM utility function u such that u(R, x) = 1,
u(R, y) = 0.4, u(R, z) = 0, u(R′, y) = 2, u(R′, x) = 0.8, u(R′, z) = 0. This util-
ity function is not neutral because u(σ(R), x) = u(R′, x) = 0.8 6= u(R, σ(x)) =
u(R, y) = 0.4.
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Note that u is not fixed in (2). Yet, if we apply a transformation to u,
we must respect (i) and (ii). We can distinguish two classes of transformation.
First, we can apply a positive affine transformation to u, i.e., u′ = αu+β, with
α > 0. This results in exactly the same VNM SCC. Second, we can apply a













+β. This yields a different VNM SCC whenever
α 6= 1. Hence, (2) does not define a single VNM SCC but a family.
We can for instance choose u so that u(R, ·) is normalized (except if R is
the trivial preference relation3), that is, u(R, x) = 1 if x R z for all z ∈ X and
u(R, y) = 0 if z R y for all z ∈ X. It is easy to check that u is neutral. The
corresponding VNM SCC is then equivalent to relative utilitarianism [Dhillon
and Mertens, 1999]. We can also choose u so that the range of u(R, ·) goes
from zero to the number of equivalence classes of safe lotteries in R. Many
other choices are of course possible.
2.2 Standard axioms
In order to characterize the family of all anonymous utilitarian VNM SCCs,
we use a result by Pivato [2014] extending a result of Myerson [1995], which is
itself an extension of a result of Young [1975]4. Our axioms are therefore very
similar to those of Young [1975]. We present them hereunder without much
comment, because they have been extensively discussed elsewhere. The first
condition says that all alternatives are treated equally.
A 1 Neutrality. For each profile % ∈ P and permutation σ on X,
σ(f(%)) = f(σ(%)).
The second condition says that all agents are treated equally.
A 2 Anonymity. For all finite N ⊂ N, all profiles %,%′∈ PN and every per-
mutation γ on N such that %i = %′γ(i), for all i ∈ N ,
f(%) = f(%′).
Young [1975] groups these two conditions under the name ‘Symmetry’.
We introduce a new piece of notation before next condition. Let % = (%i
)i∈N and %′ = (%i)i∈M be two profiles with N ∩M = ∅. Then %′′ = % ◦ %′
is the profile in PN∪M defined by
%′′i =
%i if i ∈ N%′i if i ∈M.
If f(%) is the choice set of an agent group N and f(%′) is the choice set of
another agent group M disjoint from N , and if f(%) ∩ f(%′) 6= ∅, then the
group N∪M should choose precisely the alternatives in f(%)∩f(%′). Formally,
3 The preference relation R is trivial if x R y for all x, y ∈ X.
4 The latter is closely linked to [Smith, 1973]
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A 3 Separability. Let % = (%i)i∈N and %′ = (%i)i∈M be two profiles with
N ∩M = ∅. If f(%) ∩ f(%′) 6= ∅, then f(% ◦ %′) = f(%) ∩ f(%′).
This is what Young [1975] calls Consistency while Myerson [1995] calls it
Reinforcement. We call it Separability, like Smith [1973].
Let % = (%i)i∈N and %′ = (%′i)i∈M be two profiles. We say % and %
′ are
isomorphic if there is a bijection µ : N → M such that %i = %′µ(i) for all
i ∈ N . If f(%1) is the choice set of a certain group N1, then given any second
group M disjoint from N1 and with preference profile %′, we can replicate
the first group and its preference profile (using isomorphic profiles) a sufficient
number of times so that it overwhelms the second group in a combined profile
and yield a subset of f(%1) as choice set. This kind of continuity requirement
is our Archimedean condition.
A 4 Archimedeanness. Let {N j}j∈N be a collection of disjoint subsets of N,
all of size n. Suppose {%j}j∈N is a collection of isomorphic profiles in PNj
and %′ ∈ PM with (
⋃
j∈NN
j)∩M = ∅. Then there exists h ∈ N such that, for
every k > h,
f(%1 ◦ . . . ◦ %k ◦ %′) ⊆ f(%1).
This is exactly Myerson’s (1995) Overwhelming Majority. The next condition
is a standard Pareto condition [e.g. Donaldson and Weymark, 1988].
A 5 Weak Pareto. For any profile % = (%i)i∈N ∈ P, if there are x, y ∈ X
such that x i y for all i ∈ N , then y /∈ f(%).
In our first result, we use a weakening o fthis condition and a strict version
thereof. Let (R)i denote a profile with a single voter i and a single preference
relation R.
A 6 Non-Triviality. There exists R ∈ V such that f((R)i) 6= X.
A 7 Strict Pareto. For any profile % = (%i)i∈N ∈ P, if there are x, y ∈ X
such that x %i y for all i ∈ N and x j y for some j ∈ N , then y /∈ f(%).
2.3 Preliminary result
Using the conditions of previous section, we state a preliminary result that
can almost be considered as a corollary to a result by Pivato [2014].
Proposition 1 Let #X ≥ 3. A VNM SCC f satisfies Neutrality, Anonymity,
Separability, Archimedeanness and Non-Triviality iff there exists u : V ×X →
R such that





with u neutral, i.e., u(σ(R), x) = u(R, σ(x)), for any R ∈ V , σ ∈ Σ and
x ∈ X. If f also satisfies Strict Pareto, then u(R, x) ≥ u(R, y) ⇐⇒ x R y,
for all x, y ∈ X and all R ∈ V .
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Let us notice that, without Strict Pareto, the mapping u is not necessarily
a VNM utility function and not even a utility function. It can be anything,
provided it is not constant (so as to satisfy Non-Triviality) and neutral. Yet,
with Strict Pareto, the mapping u is a utility function and Proposition 1
can thus be considered as a first characterization of utilitarianism in a very
general sense, leaving full freedom for the choice of u as long as u(R, ·) is a
utility representation of R.
It is also important to notice that using a VNM SCC f defined by (3)
already implies some interpersonal comparisons. Indeed, if two voters i, j have
the same VNM preference relation R, then the difference u(R, x)− u(R, y) is
the same number for both of them, although one could argue that the difference
in well-being is not necessarily the same for i and j. Consequently, the choice
set is the same for the profile where voter i is replaced by voter j. Moreover,
if two voters have preferences R and R′, such that R′ = σ(R) for some σ ∈ Σ,
then the corresponding mappings u(R, ·) and u(R′, ·) are identical up to a
permutation. So, if we have a profile with only two voters, with preferences R
and R′ as above, and if σ(x) = y and σ(y) = x, then both x and y belong to
f(R,R′) or none of them does.
Proof of Proposition 1. Let us assume f satisfies all five axioms. Let δ :
P × V → N be a mapping such that δ(%, R) is the number of individuals
having the preference R in the profile %. Let %∈ PN and %′∈ PN ′ be such
that δ(%, R) = δ(%′, R) for all R ∈ V . Let (R)i∈M denote the profile such that
each agent in M has the same preferences R. By Neutrality, f((Π2)i∈N ′\N ) =
f((Π2)i∈N\N ′) = X. By Separability, f(% ◦(Π2)i∈N ′\N ) = f(%) and f(%′
◦(Π2)i∈N\N ′) = f(%′). Since % ◦(Π2)i∈N ′\N and %′ ◦(Π2)i∈N\N ′ both belong
to PN∪N ′ and δ(% ◦(Π2)i∈N ′\N , R) = δ(%′ ◦(Π2)i∈N\N ′ , R) for all R ∈ V ,
Anonymity implies f(%) = f(%′). Hence f(%) depends only on (δ(%, R))R∈V .
In other words, there exists F : NV → 2X \ ∅ such that F ((δ(%, R))R∈V ) =
f(%) for all %∈ P. Because f satisfies Neutrality, Non-Triviality, Separability
and Archimedeanness, F satisfies Neutrality, Non-Triviality, Reinforcement
and Overwhelming Majority as defined in Pivato [2014]. By Proposition A.1
in Pivato [2014], there exists u : V ×X → R such that




δ(%, R)u(R, x) (4)
with u neutral, i.e., u(σ(R), x) = u(R, σ(x)), for any R ∈ V , σ ∈ Σ and x ∈ X.
Clearly, Equation (4) can be rewritten in terms of f as (3).
Let us now suppose f also satisfies Strict Pareto. Let R be a relation such
that x I y. Then, since u is neutral, it readily follows that u(R, x) = u(R, y).
Let now R be a relation such that x P w for all w ∈ X. By Strict Pareto,
{x} is the choice set of the profile containing only R. Hence, u(R, x) >
u(R,w) for all w ∈ X. Let finally R be a relation such that x P y and
suppose for contradiction u(R, x) ≤ u(R, y). Consider a relation R′ ∈ V
such that x I ′ y, x P ′ w and w I ′ z for all z ∈ X \ {x, y, w}. We have
u(R′, x) = u(R′, y) > u(R′, w) = u(R′, z) for all z ∈ X \ {x, y, z}. Let
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N1 ⊂ N be such that j /∈ N1 and let %= ((R)j ◦ (R′)i∈N1). For arbitrary
large N1, we have u(R, y) +
∑
i∈N1 u(R







′, z) for all z ∈ X \ {x, y}. Hence y ∈ f(%) but Strict
Pareto implies y /∈ f(%). This contradiction proves that u(R, x) > u(R, y). In
summary, u(R, x) ≥ u(R, y) ⇐⇒ x R y, for all x, y ∈ X and all R ∈ V . 2
The reader may have noticed that the proof does not rely on the fact that
a profile consists of VNM relations. The same theorem would therefore hold
with any set of binary relations as long as the set is closed under permutations
of X.
2.4 A new condition
All axioms presented so far are standard in the social choice literature. Usu-
ally, they are imposed on SCCs acting on profiles of preference relations on
unstructured sets, but nothing prevents us from imposing them on a SCC act-
ing on profiles of preference relations defined on a structured set (e.g., Π), as
we just did. Yet, none of these axioms makes use of the structure of Π; none
of them helps us to exploit the potentially cardinal information contained in
the VNM preference relations. Our last condition precisely does this.
A quick look at (2) shows that not only the number of agents preferring x
over y (resp. y over x) matters when comparing x and y, but also the extent by
which they prefer x over y, i.e. the difference u(%i, x)−u(%i, y). Hence, many
agents slightly preferring x over y can be overruled by few agents strongly
preferring y over x. In other words, there is some kind of interplay between
the number of agents preferring x over y and the extent by which they prefer
x over y. Let us formalize this without making reference to the utilities, but
only to the primitives.
Suppose a group of n1 agents all have the same preferences: they strictly
prefer x to y to z. The other alternatives have any other position. Moreover,
all agents in this group are indifferent between the safe lottery y and the
mixture λx + (1 − λ)z, with λ = 0.9. We might consider this as relevant
information about the relative standing of y vis-à-vis x and z. More specifically,
we might consider that they support x more than y, but only slightly, while
they strongly support x against z. Suppose another group of n2 agents have the
same preferences as the n1 agents, up to a permutation σ such that σ(x) = y,
σ(z) = x. Hence, all agents in the second group prefer y to x and they support
y against x to the same extent as agents in the first group support x to z, that
is strongly. So, the ratio “support for x against y in group 1 over support for
y against x in group 2” is (1− λ)/1. Suppose we consider a society consisting
only of these two groups of agents. If we want to account for the strength or
intensity of preferences, and if we accept the idea that many agents supporting
x slightly more than y can be compensated by few agents supporting y much
more than x, then we may be tempted to consider that this compensation
occurs when n2/n1 = 1−λ. In that case, x is chosen if and only if y is chosen.
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The formal statement of this condition is more complex: we do not impose
this condition for all groups of agents, but only for all groups included in some
infinite subset of N because we do not want to exclude the possibility that
some agents have a different status and are treated differently. Let (R)i∈N
denote a profile consisting of #N copies of the preference relation R.
A 8 VNM-Comparability. There exists an infinite subset O of N such that,
whenever
– R ∈ V is such that x P y P z and y I λx+ (1− λ)z,
– N1 and N2 are disjoint subsets of O,
– σ ∈ Σ is such that σ(x) = y, σ(z) = x











As far as we know, this condition has never been discussed in the literature.
We do not claim that it is compelling or even appealing. Paraphrasing Sen
[1976], p.254, it is not designed “to provide an axiomatic justification of” util-
itarianism. Instead, we chose “a set of axioms with the focus on transparency
rather than on immediate appeal” [Sen, 1976, p.259].5 For a discussion of
whether risk preferences may inform social choices over non risky options, see
[e.g. Chambers and Echenique, 2012, Fleurbaey and Zuber, 2017].
The interest of our VNM-Comparability is that it allows us to character-
ize the anonymous utilitarian VNM SCC exclusively in terms of empirically
observable primitives, thereby escaping the ambiguities of the social welfare
functionals approach, as discussed by Morreau and Weymark [2016].
2.5 Main result
We are now ready to state our main characterization theorem.
Theorem 1 Let #X ≥ 3. A VNM SCC satisfies Neutrality, Anonymity,
Separability, Archimedeanness, Weak Pareto and VNM-Comparability iff it is
anonymous and utilitarian.
This result is not a justification of anonymous utilitarianism, because, as men-
tioned earlier, we do not consider our axioms as compelling. In some contexts,
a social planner might consider them as appealing or reasonable and therefore
decide to use an anonymous utilitarian SCC. In other contexts, another social
planner might have strong arguments against our axioms and thus decide not
to use an anonymous utilitarian SCC. In both cases, our axioms constitute
unambiguous elements that can be used in a debate about the anonymous
utilitarian VNM SCC.
5 Our view of the axiomatic analysis is also close in spirit to that of Thomson [2001], in
a different domain.
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Some kind of interpersonal comparability was already implied by Proposi-
tion 1. The addition of VNM Comparability in Theorem 1, for characterizing
anonymous utilitarianism, makes clear how some kind of cardinal information,
latent in the individual preference relations, is used to make interpersonal com-
parisons of differences of utilities. But, unlike invariance conditions such as,
e.g. Cardinal Unit Comparability [Roberts, 1980], it does this without ever
mentioning individual utilities.
Proof of Theorem 1. Let us assume f satisfies all six axioms. Weak Pareto
implies Non-Triviality and, thanks to Proposition 1, f is defined by (3). We
must now prove that u(R, ·) is a VNM utility function representing R, for any
R ∈ V . To this end, we consider three exhaustive cases.
1. R has only one equivalence class. Formally, R ∈ V is such that x I y, for all
x, y ∈ X. Since u is neutral, u(R, x) = u(R, y) for all x, y ∈ X and u(R, ·)
is therefore a VNM utility function representing R.
2. R has more than one equivalence class, but all safe lotteries are grouped
in exactly two equivalence classes. Formally, R ∈ V is such that x P y and
[z I x or z I y], for all z ∈ X. Define A = {z ∈ X : z I x}. By Weak Pareto,
f(R) ∩ (X \ A) = ∅. Since f(R) 6= ∅, there is w ∈ A such that w ∈ f(R).
By Neutrality, f(R) = A and u(R, z) = u(R, x) for all z ∈ A. Since u is
neutral, u(R, z) = u(R, y) for all z /∈ A. Since x ∈ f(R) and y /∈ f(R),
we have u(R, x) > u(R, y). In conclusion, u(R, ·) is a VNM utility function
representing R.
3. R has more than one equivalence class and the safe lotteries are grouped
in k equivalence classes, with k ≥ 3. Let us rename the alternatives as
x1, . . . , xk, . . . , x#X so that x1 P x2 P . . . P xk. We build u(R, ·) in a
number of steps.
(a) Utility of x1 and xk. Choose any arbitrary value for x1 and xk, provided
x1 > xk.
(b) Utility of x2. Let λ2 be such that x2 I λ2x1 + (1 − λ2)xk and assume
for now λ2 ∈ Q. Let N1, N2 ⊂ O be such that #N2/#N1 = 1 − λ2.
This is possible because λ2 ∈ Q. Let σ2 be such that σ2(xk) = x1 and
σ2(xi) = xi+1 for all i ∈ {1, . . . k − 1}. Notice that this permutation
is like σ in the statement of VNM-Comparability. By Weak Pareto,









. By VNM-Comparability, they both belong
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Therefore
#N1u(R, x1) + #N
2u(R, xk) = #N
1u(R, x2) + #N
2u(R, x1)
or
u(R, x1)− u(R, x2)




= 1− λ2 (5)
or
u(R, x2)− u(R, xk)
u(R, x1)− u(R, xk)
= λ2.
This proves that, when λ2 ∈ Q, u(R, ·) restricted to {x1, x2, xk} coin-
cides with a VNM utility function. If λ2 /∈ Q, we can “squeeze”
u(R, x1)− u(R, x2)
u(R, x1)− u(R, xk)
between two sequences of ratios #N2/#N1 both converging to 1− λ2,
respectively from below and from above.
(c) Utility of xi, i ∈ {3, . . . , k − 1}. Let λi be such that xi I λix1 + (1 −
λi)xk and assume for now (1 − λi)/(1 − λ2) ∈ Q. Let N1, N2 ⊂ O
be such that #N2/#N1 = (1 − λi)/(1 − λ2). This is possible because
(1−λi)/(1−λ2) ∈ Q. Let σi be such that σi(x1) = xi, σi(xj) = xj−1 for
all j ∈ {2, . . . , i} and σi(xj) = xj for all j ∈ {i + 1, . . . k}. Notice that
σi(R), R and σ
−1
i are respectively like R, σ(R) and σ in the statement










. By VNM-Comparability, they both belong to the choice

























#N1u(R, x1) + #N
2u(R, x2) = #N
1u(R, xi) + #N
2u(R, x1)
or
u(R, x1)− u(R, xi)








Let us multiply this equation by (5). We obtain
u(R, x1)− u(R, xi)
u(R, x1)− u(R, xk)
= 1− λi.
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This proves that, when (1 − λi)/(1 − λ2) ∈ Q, u(R, ·) restricted to
{x1, xi, xk} coincides with a VNM utility function. If (1−λi)/(1−λ2) /∈
Q, we can “squeeze”
u(R, x1)− u(R, xi)
u(R, x1)− u(R, x2)
between two sequences of ratios #N2/#N1 both converging to (1 −
λi)/(1− λ2), respectively from below and from above.
So, for every i ∈ {2, . . . , k − 1}, u(R, ·) restricted to {x1, xi, xk} coincides
with a VNM utility function. In summary, u(R, ·) is a VNM utility function
representing R.
So, in any case, u(R, ·) is a VNM utility function representing R. 2
3 A characterization of relative utilitarianism
There are characterizations of relative utilitarianism in the literature, in a
multi-profile setting and without the assumption that utilities have been mea-
sured beforehand (see Section 1). It is nevertheless interesting to know what
needs to be added to Theorem 1 in order to single out relative utilitarianism.
Let us define the relative utilitarian VNM Social Choice Correspondence by





where u : V ×X → R is such that
(a) u(R, ·) is a VNM utility function, for any R ∈ V ,
(b) xRy (resp. yRx) for all y ∈ X, with at least one strict preference, implies
u(R, x) = 1 (resp. 0).
Notice that this defines a unique VNM SCC. Besides, this VNM SCC is
anonymous and utilitarian. Indeed, (a) and (b) together imply that u is neu-
tral. So, the relative utilitarian VNM SCC satisfies all conditions of Theorem 1.
The question is: which extra condition is satisfied by the relative utilitarian
VNM SCC and only by this one. The answer turns out to be simple: when
there are two agents, if a top ranked alternative of the first agent is a bottom
ranked alternative of the second agent and vice versa, then both alternatives
are chosen or none is chosen.
A 9 Ordinal Comparability. There exists an infinite subset O of N such that,
whenever
– R ∈ V is not trivial and is such that x R w R y for all w ∈ X,
– R′ ∈ V is not trivial and is such that y R′ w R′ x for all w ∈ X,
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The structure of this condition is similar to that of VNM-Comparability. We
call it Ordinal Comparability because it does not exploit the structure of Π;
it is possible to impose it on a SCC acting on profiles of preference relations
defined on abstract unstructured sets.
Theorem 2 A VNM SCC satisfies Neutrality, Anonymity, Separability, Archimedean-
ness, Weak Pareto, VNM-Comparability and Ordinal Comparability iff it is the
relative utilitarian VNM SCC defined by (6).
There are many differences between [Dhillon and Mertens, 1999] and our
result. First, our set of voters is variable while theirs is fixed. Second, we
characterize a procedure for aggregating preference relations into a choice set
while they aggregate preference relations into a social preference relation. We
consider these two differences as minor and almost technical. A more funda-
mental difference is that our choice set never contains a lottery while their
social preference relations is defined on the set of all lotteries (and is VNM).
In our framework, lotteries play an instrumental role: we are not interested in
lotteries, but we use them for obtaining cardinal information about the alter-
natives. Depending on what we are interested in (lotteries over alternatives of
just alternatives), their result or ours may be more relevant.
Proof of Theorem 2. By Theorem 1, f is anonymous and utilitarian. Let
R be a non-trivial relation in V . We suppose without loss of generality that
x R w R y for all w ∈ X. Let R′ be the relation uniquely defined by y P ′ x and
w I ′ x for all w ∈ X. Then R and R′ are as in the statement of Ordinal Com-
parability. Let i, j and N ⊂ O be as in the statement of Ordinal Comparability.




because u(R, x) >
u(R,w) and u(R′, x) = u(R′, w) so that u(R, x)+u(R′, x) > u(R,w)+u(R′, w).
Hence x or y belong to the choice set and, thanks to Ordinal Comparabil-




. By virtue of (3), this implies
u(R, x)+u(R′, x) = u(R, y)+u(R′, y) or u(R, x)−u(R, y) = u(R′, y)−u(R′, x).
Since this is true for every relation R, the difference between the maximal and
minimal utilities is the same for every preference relation. We can suppose
without loss of generality that this difference is equal to 1 and that the mini-
mal utility is zero. 2
At this point, the reader may wonder what we obtain if we impose Ordi-
nal Comparability without VNM-Comparability. It is fairly easy to prove the
following result (the proof is left to the reader).
Theorem 3 A VNM SCC satisfies Neutrality, Anonymity, Separability, Archimedean-
ness, Strict Pareto and Ordinal Comparability iff iff there exists u : V ×X → R
such that (3) holds with u neutral, normalized and such that u(R, ·) is a utility
representation of R.
14 Thierry Marchant
4 Logical independence of the conditions
Examples 1–5 below show that all conditions of Proposition 1 are logically
independent. Similarly, Examples 1–6 show that all conditions of Theorem 3
are logically independent. Unfortunately, we are not able to prove the indepen-
dence of the conditions in Theorem 1 or 2. Indeed, Archimedeanness might
be implied by the other conditions of Theorem 1 but Example 7 nevertheless
shows that VNM-Comparability is not implied by the other conditions of The-
orem 2. Proving the independence of the conditions (or providing alternative
characterizations with weaker conditions) is therefore left as an open problem.
Example 1 (Neutrality) Let x, y be distinct elements of X and let V ∗ be
a proper subset of V containing all relations R ∈ V such that x R w R y or
y R w R x for all w ∈ X. Define g : V ×X → R so that, for all R ∈ V , g(R, ·)
is the normalized VNM utility function representing R (except for the trivial
preference relation). Define u : V ×X → R by
u(R, ·) =
{












This VNM SCC obviously violates Neutrality. The reason it satisfies VNM-
Comparability is that the relations R and σ(R) in the statement of VNM-
Comparability both belong to V ∗ or both to V \ V ∗. The reason it satisfies
Ordinal Comparability is that the relations R and R′ in the statement of Ordi-
nal Comparability both belong to V ∗ or both to V \V ∗. The other conditions
are clearly satisfied.
Example 2 (Anonymity) Let u : V ×X → R be such that, for all R ∈ V ,
u(R, ·) is a VNM utility function representing R and u is neutral. Let O be any
















Anonymity is blatantly violated. To understand why f satisfies VNM-Comparability
and Ordinal Comparability, notice that both conditions only apply to agents










which is the plain utilitarian VNM SCC. The other conditions obviously hold.
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u(R1, ·) u(R2, ·) u(R3, ·) u(R4, ·) u(R5, ·) u(R6, ·)
x 0.8 0 0.9 0.5 0.9 0.3
y 0.9 1 1 0 0.4 1
z 0 0.9 0.6 0.9 1 0
w 1 0.7 0 1 0 0.9
Table 1 Normalized VNM representations of R1, . . . , R6
Example 3 (Strict Pareto) Let u : V ×X → R be such that, for all R ∈ V ,










Example 4 (Separability) Consider the profile (%i)i∈N . Let (N1, . . . , Nq)
be a partition of N such that, for all j, l ∈ {1, . . . , q}, for all i ∈ Nj , k ∈ Nl,
– if j = l, then ∃σ ∈ Σ : σ(%i) =%k
– if j 6= l, then 6 ∃σ ∈ Σ : σ(%i) =%k.
In other words, (N1, . . . , Nq) is a partition of N according to the orbits of R.
Define a new profile %∗ of weak orders on X where, for each j ∈ {1, . . . , q},
#Nj voters have identical preferences, induced by
∑
i∈Nj u(%i, ·), where u(R, ·)





the Copeland Social Choice Correspondence applied to the new profile %∗.
This VNM SCC clearly satisfies Neutrality, Anonymity and Strict Pareto.
Since the statement of the VNM Comparability condition involves two prefer-
ence relations belonging to a single orbit, it is easy to see that VNM Compa-
rability is satisfied. For the same reason and because u is normalized, Ordinal
Comparability also holds.
Let us show that f violates Separability. SupposeX = {x, y, z, w},R1, . . . , R6 ∈
V and the normalized VNM representations ofR1, . . . , R6 are as in Table 1. No-
tice that all relations R1, . . . , R6 belong to different orbits. Let N = {1, . . . , 6}
and %= (%i)i∈N be defined by %1=%2=%3=%4= R1, %5= R2 and %6= R3.
The corresponding profile %∗ has 6 weak orders: 4 voters with preferences
wyxz, 1 voter with yzwx and 1 voter with yxzw. The largest Copeland score
in this new profile %∗ is 3 and corresponds to w. Hence f((%i)i∈N ) = {w}.

















24= R6. The corre-
sponding profile %′∗ has 14 weak orders: 5 voters with preferences wzxy, 4 vot-
ers with zxyw and 5 voters with ywxz. The largest Copeland score in this new
profile %′∗ is 1 and corresponds to both w and z. Hence f((%
′
i)i∈N ) = {w, z}.
Let us now consider the profile %′′=% ◦ %′. The corresponding profile %′′∗
has 20 voters and simple arithmetic shows that f(%′′) = {y} while Separability
implies f(%′′) = {w}.
We now prove f satisfies Archimedeanness. Suppose the partition corre-
sponding to %1 has q components. The corresponding profile %1∗ has, for each
i ∈ {1, . . . , q}, #N1i identical weak orders, induced by the sum of the utilities
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in N1i . If the partition corresponding to %
′ has q′ components, then the par-
tition corresponding to %1 ◦ . . . ◦ %k ◦ %′ has then q + s components, with
0 ≤ s ≤ q′. When k →∞, the corresponding profile (%1 ◦ . . . ◦ %k ◦ %′)∗ has,
for each i ∈ {1, . . . , q}, at least k#N1i identical weak orders (the same ones
as in %1∗) and, for each i ∈ {q + 1, . . . , s}, exactly #N ′i identical weak orders,
induced by the sum of the utilities in N ′i . So, when k →∞, the Copeland rule
applied to (%1 ◦ . . . ◦ %k ◦ %′)∗ yields a subset of f(%1).
Example 5 (Archimedeanness) Let u : V × X → R be such that, for all
R ∈ V , u(R, ·) is a normalized utility function (not necessarily VNM) repre-


















)#{i ∈ N : x %i z for all z ∈ X}.
Put differently, this VNM SCC successively applies the argmax to two different
criteria: first the sum of the utilities and, then, a criterion based on the number
of times an alternative is maximal in individual preferences. This VNM SCC
clearly satisfies Neutrality, Anonymity and Strict Pareto.
If an alternative x is selected in f(%), it is maximal in % according to the
utilitarian criterion and according to the second criterion. If the same alterna-
tive x is selected in f(%′), it is also maximal in %′ according to both criteria.
Since both criteria are additive, x is again maximal in % ◦ %′ according to
both criteria and, hence, Separability holds.
To see that f satisfies Ordinal Comparability, notice that, for all profiles
as in the statement of these conditions, we have
#{i ∈ N : x %i z for all z ∈ X} = #{i ∈ N : y %i z for all z ∈ X}
so that Ordinal Comparability obviously holds.
Suppose X = {x, y, z}, the normalized representation of R is u(R, x) =
1, u(R, y) = u(R, z) = 0 and the normalized representation of R′ is u(R, y) =
1, u(R, x) = 0.5 and u(R, z) = 0. Let N1 = {2, 3, 4},M = {1},%1= (%1i
)i∈N1 = (R,R
′, R′) and %′= (%i)i∈M = (R). Then h(%1) = {x, y} and f(%1
) = {y}. For any k > 0, h(%1 ◦ . . . ◦ %k ◦ %′) = {x} and f(%1 ◦ . . . ◦ %k ◦ %′
) = {x}, thereby violating Archimedeanness.
We finally show that this example also violates VNM-Comparability. Let
X = {x, y, z}. Suppose u(R, ·) is a VNM utility function for all R ∈ V ,
u(R, x) = 1, u(R, y) = 0.5, u(R, z) = 0 and u(R, y) = 1, u(R, z) = 0.5 and
u(R, x) = 0. Let N = {1, 2},M = {3},%= ((R)i∈N ◦ (R′)i∈M ). Then h(%) =
{x, y} and f(%) = {x}, thereby violating VNM-Comparability.
Example 6 (Ordinal Comparability) Let u : V ×X → R be such that, for
all R ∈ V , u(R, ·) is a VNM utility function representing R and u is neutral
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This VNM SCC clearly violates Ordinal Comparability and satisfies all other
conditions.
Example 7 (VNM-Comparability) Let g : V × X → R be such that, for
all R ∈ V , g(R, ·) is a VNM utility function representing R, with g neutral.















This VNM SCC violates VNM-Comparability because u(R, ·) is the third
power of a VNM utility function representing R. It is therefore monotoni-
cally but not linearly related to a VNM utility function representing R. It
clearly satisfies all other conditions.
5 Discussion
5.1 The choice of u
Suppose a social planner buys all axioms of Theorem 1 and therefore wants to
use an anonymous utilitarian VNM SCC. Yet, she does not adhere to Ordinal
Comparability and, hence, she does not want to use the relative utilitarian
VNM SCC. She then faces a choice: among the infinite family of anonymous
utilitarian VNM SCCs, which one is she going to use? Is there a reasoned way
to select a specific member of this family? Our results do not answer this ques-
tion, but Theorem 2 shows a possible direction: instead of imposing Ordinal
Comparability in terms of maximal and minimal elements, we could enrich
our primitives with two particular alternatives with an identical meaning to
all voters (called interpersonally significant norm by Blackorby and Donald-
son [1982]), and restate Ordinal Comparability in terms of these two particular
alternatives. The existence and meaningfulness of such interpersonally signif-
icant norms is another debate. Other directions are perhaps possible.
5.2 SCC vs SWF
Our results are stated in terms of a social choice correspondence while most of
the literature about cardinal social choice is stated in terms of social welfare
function (SWF). In particular, the characterization of relative utilitarianism
by Dhillon and Mertens [1999] is in terms of a SWF.
It is easy to restate our Theorem 1 in terms of SWFs. We just need to
restate the VNM-Comparability condition.
A 10 VNM-Comparability (SWF). There exists an infinite subset O of N such
that, whenever
– R ∈ V is such that x P y P z and y I λx+ (1− λ)z,
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– N1 and N2 are disjoint subsets of O,
– σ ∈ Σ is such that σ(x) = y, σ(z) = x
– #N2/#N1 = 1− λ,
then x and y are indifferent in the social preferences corresponding to profile
(R)i∈N1 ◦ (σ(R))i∈N2 .
We then have the following conjecture, using the new VNM-Comparability
plus the conditions of Smith [1973] and a Pareto condition.
Conjecture 1 Let #X ≥ 3. A VNM SWF satisfies Neutrality, Anonymity,
Separability, Archimedeanness, Weak Pareto and VNM-Comparability iff it is
the anonymous utilitarian VNM SWF, that is, x is socially weakly preferred
to y in the profile (%i)i∈N iff
∑
i∈N u(%i, x) ≥
∑
i∈N u(%i, y).
Proving this conjecture would involve proving first a variant of Proposition A1
in [Pivato, 2014], recasted in terms of a SWF. This is beyond the scope of this
paper.
5.3 Other measurement techniques
In this paper, in order to obtain cardinal preferential information about the
finite set of alternatives, we embed them in a rich set (the set of all lotter-
ies) and we observe the preferences of the voters on this rich set. Provided
the preferences satisfy some properties, it is possible to infer some cardinal
preferential information about the alternatives.
Notice that there are other ways to obtain cardinal preferential informa-
tion about a finite set of alternatives. Suppose the alternatives are elements of
a Cartesian product. For instance X = X1 ×X2 where X1 = {100, 110, 120}
and X2 = {30, 40, 50} are amounts to be invested in two different projects.
We can embed the set X in the richer set [100, 120]× [30, 50] and observe the
preferences of the voters over this richer set. Provided their preferences sat-
isfy some conditions, using techniques of conjoint measurement, it is possible
to represent the preferences by means of two utility functions unique up to
positive affine transformations [Debreu, 1960, Krantz et al., 1971]. Restating
Proposition 1 for such preference relations is immediate. It is then probably
not too difficult to devise a new comparability condition, akin to VNM Com-
parability, in order to characterize anonymous utilitarianism in this context.
Techniques of algebraic difference measurement or extensive measurement can
also be used [Krantz et al., 1971]. In the latter case, the utilities are unique up
to a positive linear transformation (ratio scale) and this may lead to a subset
of the anonymous utilitarian family.
An interesting consequence of our approach (without individual utilities) is
that the exact form of the comparability condition would depend on the mea-
surement technique (decision under risk, conjoint measurement, etc.) while,
with the classical approach (social welfare functional acting on profiles of in-
dividual utilities), the same invariance condition is used irrespective of what
utilities mean and of the way they have been measured.
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